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Abstract
Elections are a time when communication is
important in democracies, including over so-
cial media. This paper describes a case study
of applying NLP to determine the extent to
which misinformation and external manipu-
lation were present on Twitter during a na-
tional election. We use three methods to detect
the spread of misinformation: analysing un-
usual spatial and temporal behaviours; detect-
ing known false claims and using these to esti-
mate the total prevalence; and detecting am-
plifiers through language use. We find that
while present, detectable spread of misinfor-
mation on Twitter was remarkably low during
the election period in Denmark.
1 Introduction
Misinformation is a constantly changing phe-
nomenon (Rojecki and Meraz, 2016; Southwell
et al., 2018; Harley, 2017), and detecting its spread
between individuals online can be difficult (Der-
czynski et al., 2015a). Meanwhile, it undermines
our trust in information and can distort or dam-
age our democratic and other governance struc-
tures. Misinformation can also be produced at
high speed and in large volumes, making manual
checking impossible.
Danish poses a particularly interesting chal-
lenge to automatic detection of misinformation be-
cause of the low availability of NLP resources for
the language (Kirkedal et al., 2019). Taking the
Danish national election 2019 as a case study, we
ask the following research questions: How might
we use natural language processing (NLP) to au-
tomatically identify spread of misinformation dur-
ing an election campaign on Twitter? and, consec-
utively, is the spread of misinformation on Twitter
a threat to the Danish political discourse?
Detecting structured propaganda campaigns is
difficult for a number of reasons, and likely to re-
main so. Firstly, the adversary is constantly adapt-
ing and developing new strategies. This may look
like a new network spreading pattern, a new post-
ing strategy, etc. Automated methods for detecting
misinformation are therefore likely to decrease in
efficacy over time. Secondly, many tools for pro-
paganda detection use natural language process-
ing, which is well-developed for English, but not
nearly as advanced for other languages, making
groups using other languages easier to infiltrate
undetected. Thirdly, better deep learning gener-
ation of text, image and video means better qual-
ity synthetic evidence to “support” false claims –
and greater quantities of it. Finally, the lines are
blurred and subjective. It is not always clear that
an actor is malicious, or that a claim is outright
false, or that a social media account is an ampli-
fier. This makes it difficult to train machine learn-
ing approaches.
Due to this, the general approach taken in this
research has been to use NLP to detect lists of can-
didate manipulative or propaganda-spreading ac-
counts and then have a human evaluate the results.
While keeping a human in the loop may increase
the risk of reduced automatic performance, a hu-
man evaluator is vital to preventing the machine
from becoming the final arbiter of good and bad
content, or in this context, of truth.
2 Background
Systematic interference in social media discourse
has often sought to divide (Stewart et al., 2018;
Marwick and Lewis, 2017; Bastos and Mercea,
2019; Deb et al., 2019), be that through political
hyperpartisanship or through intensifying existing
opinions. In relatively constrained environments
such as news fora, users are even often aware of
these behaviours (Mihaylov et al., 2015).
One way to find structured online propaganda
is to find the amplifiers spreading information
into the area of study (Wu et al., 2016). Mis-
information is spread through sources and am-
plifiers (Weedon et al., 2017; Alaphilippe et al.,
2019). Amplifiers target specific groups of peo-
ple, and feed them stories that should match their
interests. One example could be a Facebook group
called “Brøndby Fans Secret News”, that would
target a football fan demographic using paid ad-
vertisements. The stories are often supplied by
amplifiers by sharing, retweeting, or copying other
content. This means the manipulation can be au-
tomated. Such a set-up works well because people
within a special-interest group do not expect group
information to be verifiable. Furthermore, groups
with narrow interest tend to have more trust, partly
due to the effect of homophily (Tang et al., 2013).
Some previous work has investigated social
media for misinformation campaigns. Gorwa
(2017) shortlisted 500 accounts for manual exam-
ination, providing a characterisation of both bot
and manual Facebook activity. Kusˇen and Strem-
beck (2018) found, through sentiment and network
analysis, that misinformation spread in the 2018
Austrian elections came mostly from followers of
the eventual winner. Gorrell et al. (2019) investi-
gated manipulation on a range of political issues
and discussions. This included two UK votes,
where there was mild support from Russian ac-
counts in just two of many misleading claims, and
found that low-effort strategies of retweeting and
spreading generally pleasing content had low im-
pact. Rather, serious manipulation is a long-term
campaign, where the manipulator engages through
deeply-felt issues in the target country and builds
sympathy and a following based on those. A re-
lated study (Narayanan et al.) agreed and found
that Russian-origin manipulators were not preva-
lent on YouTube or Instagram. We examine cases
of those issues for Denmark in Section 5.1.
3 Data
Danish national elections are declared typically
by the prime minister, which begins a three-week
campaign period ended by a vote. Thus, they make
a good subject for case study, as election-related
content has an easily-identifable start date (and
ends on election day).
Data was drawn from the publicly-accessible
Twitter API. We constructed three datasets to
model politically engaged content and users.
General dataset We sampled from the #dkpol
hashtag, which is about politics in Denmark, and
#fv19, which was dominated by discussions rel-
evant to the Danish national election (Folket-
ingsvalg 2019). By sampling of this hashtag
we identified 7005 unique user accounts that had
posted on one of these hashtags during the elec-
tion period. We retrieved each account’s 200 most-
recent tweets, yielding 1.1 million tweets in all.
Party-supporting dataset To build a dataset of
party-supporting accounts, we first looked at of-
ficial Twitter accounts of each party (Section A),
capturing two hundred most-recent tweets. We
make the assume retweets indicate support (boyd
et al., 2010); Non-endorsing retweets tend to
be quotes including a comment, and ironic na-
tive retweets tend to be used by a narrow seg-
ment of users unless there is a long lag before
retweet (Guerra et al., 2017). While anecdotal
counter-examples can be found, the majority of
retweets suggest not only interest but also trust in
a message (Metaxas et al., 2015). For each ac-
count we collect the 200 most recent tweets, giv-
ing a dataset of 196,000 tweets from supporters
and 2,300 tweets from official party accounts.
Candidate dataset After all candidates standing
in the election are officially registered in the elec-
tion, we used a manually-constructed list detailing
Twitter accounts for all 900 candidates. Of these,
614 were on Twitter, and 362 active during the
election.1 This dataset contains up the (up to) 200
most recent tweets from each candidate’s account.
This paper refers occasionally to “Danish Twit-
ter”; this is considered to be the union of tweets
sent in Denmark, tweets sent in Danish, and tweets
from accounts based in Denmark. We cannot
make assumptions about the nationality of Twit-
ter account users, or their true location, hence the
above definition. Captures were performed be-
tween 28 May 2019 and 6 June 2019.
The statement (Bender and Friedman, 2018) for
the Party-supporting and Candidate data is:
• Curation Rationale As above
• Language Variety Colloquial Danish, da
• Speaker Demographic Politically engaged
Danish-speakers; demographic unknown
• Annotator Demographic Males aged 25-40;
mixture of Danish, Swedish and British
1https://twitter.com/runello/status/1136931663873810432
• Speech Situation Captured online text, anal-
ysed while current
• Text Characteristics Social media text
As it bears personal political opinions, the data
is sensitive under GDPR and cannot be shared.
4 Methods
To find manipulation and outside influence, we
used three techniques – analysing account activ-
ity, looking for spread of known misinformation,
and seeing what languages accounts use.
In every instance, the goal is to find accounts
and messages that will then be investigated man-
ually. Given the seriousness of the subject matter
at hand, and the damage potential in e.g. mistak-
enly accusing user accounts of spreading propa-
ganda, or of mistakenly declaring a sphere clear
of propaganda, some human intervention in ma-
chine conclusions is required at each point – espe-
cially given the relatively young age of this prob-
lem in the digital, and the rate at which adversaries
may be capable of adapting to avoid misinforma-
tion detection techniques.
4.1 Checking for known misinformation
By searching for instances of known misinforma-
tion on Twitter, we can establish a lower bound for
misinformative content.
Misinformation can be found using fact-
verification resources. For English, one might
use Snopes2 or Politifact.3 In the case of Dan-
ish, there is a set of known-false claims and sto-
ries, curated and analysed by a Danish news desk
named TjekDet.4 We took the set of false and mis-
leading claims found over the past three months
(from 1 March 2019 until 3 June 2019). This
amounted to 38 false claims found spread through
Danish media.5 We searched for evidence of these
in social media activity in our party-supporting
and candidate datasets. To search, we used both
keyword-based search, following a claim quoted
in the TjekDet report when present, and also by
finding tweets with FastText sentence vectors (Bo-
janowski et al., 2016) that were similar to the mis-
informative claim’s. Each candidate instance of
misinformation spread was checked manually.
2https://www.snopes.com/
3https://www.politifact.com/
4https://www.mm.dk/tjekdet
5From https://www.mm.dk/tjekdet/artikel.aspx?type=106
Party supported P(misinformative|party)
SK 0.04%
DF 0.04%
Enhedslisten 0.01%
Others n/a
Table 1: Probability of an account’s messages being
misinformation given support for a particular party.
From the 200 most-recent tweets from supporters and
candidates of each party, compared to a set of known
misinformation stories. Some data is available for other
parties but at levels levels too low to be informative.
Our results indicated a low minimum bound
for misinformation on Danish Twitter. One in
every 94,000 messages (roughly 0.001%) carried
known misinformation. Many of the misinfor-
mative stories were not found at all in the data.
While this is likely part due to Facebook being the
dominant social media platform in Denmark, we
would expect to see a higher degree of misinfor-
mative/propaganda stories being shared on Twit-
ter. For comparison, in the US 2016 election,
Facebook sharing of mainstream news and of mis-
information reached roughly equal levels (Silver-
man, 2016). Facebook is too difficult to mon-
itor automatically during emerging or mid-scale
events, such as the case study in this paper; this
is because of Facebook’s restrictions, unless some
kind of research agreement is already in place.
Using our party-supporting dataset (Section 3)
also shows which party’s supporters spread the
most misinformation. Results are in Table 1. Fig-
ures are again generally low. The most significant
rumours here were around police supply of fuel
for a Koran burning6 and about crime rising, espe-
cially in connection with foreigners.7
Based on these counts from our sample, it
should be possible to estimate the amount of
known misinformation on Twitter during the elec-
tion period. The unobserved part can be estimated
using smoothing methods, below.
Estimate Total Relevant Traffic Our data is a
subsample of Twitter posts during the election.
To accurately scale estimates of misinformation
we need to estimate the total number of mes-
sages. The target is the number of messages on
#dkpol from 7 May to 5 June 2019. We captured
1,046 of 1,788 hours in the voting period, yielding
6https://www.mm.dk/tjekdet/artikel/koeber-politiet-
taendvaeske-til-paludans-koranafbraending
7https://www.mm.dk/tjekdet/artikel/kriminaliteten-
bliver-vaerre
146,944 tweets. Our capture never hit Twitter’s
50-messages-per-second threshold. As the dataset
covers 59.2% of the time period, we estimate the
total at 250K tweets.
As we will use data from user timelines to esti-
mate misinformation spread, there are two poten-
tial sources of inaccuracy: firstly, we will assume
that misinformation spread is the same before and
during an election. However, we are calculating
a lower bound. Second, we assume that misinfor-
mation will be shared on #dkpol; while this is not
guaranteed, the skew shown in the TjekDet source
is political, and it is fair to assume that misinfor-
mation during elections will be political in nature.
Discounting for Unobserved Events We apply
Good-Turing discounting (Good, 1953) to esti-
mate the scale of the unobserved misinformation.
Good-Turing considers that there are a distinct
number of categories, of which X have been ob-
served; that a frequency vector C¯ holds observa-
tion counts for each item x ∈ X , denoted Cx; and
that the frequency of frequencies vector Nc hold-
ing how many times the frequency count c occurs
in C. The goal is then to estimate the size of the
unobserved mass, i.e. the number of events with
observed frequency 0, N0.
Nc =
∑
x:count(x)=c
1 (1)
The total number of objects observed is:
N =
∞∑
c=1
cNc (2)
The MLE count forNc is c; under Good-Turing,
this becomes the smoothed count, c∗:
c∗ = (c+ 1)
Nc+1
Nc
(3)
Thus, the extent of unobserved events can be
estimated with N0.
Determine Categories We consider two sets of
categories: the first is groups of political support-
ers – the second, misinformative stories.
Estimating N0(supp) represents the amount of
unobserved misinformation spreading by party
supporters. The categories are parties.
Estimating N0(stories) represents the amount
of unobserved misinformation spread by party
supporters, where the categories are individual
misinformative claims.
Figure 1: Time of day that politically-active users post
on Danish Twitter.
N0(stories) is a little more interesting, as
Good-Turing is agnostic to what the actual cate-
gories mean, and so this term estimates the spread
of any set of stories even those not already in-
cluded by TjekDet. N>1 counts for these unseen
misinformative stories are missing from the total
counts, and so it will be an underestimate.
Re-Estimate Lower Bound Based on these,
we re-calculate the amount of known misinfor-
mation on Danish Twitter during the election,
first by party. The data is sparse with low
counts; the Good-Turing estimates of missed party
shares come out at under one missed post (pGT ∗
(unseen) = 0.03), as do the Good-Turing esti-
mates of missed stories (pGT ∗ (unseen) = 0.07),
even when corrected for dataset size. Both point to
a small lower bound for misinformation on Danish
Twitter during the election.
4.2 Temporal Activity Patterns
People publish and send messages at the time that
their target audience is active on the platform and
likely to pay attention. Those that push out a
burst of tweets rapidly in a short period of time,
or that post uniformly throughout the day, can be
suspicious. For example, a human will post spo-
radically and irregularly, and over time, is likely
to send messages outside of their usual window,
or send messages faster than they can be com-
posed and typed. In contrast, we expect that an
automatically-run account (e.g. a bot, a favoured
tool of disinformers) will stick to rules, and that
in general the rules will not implement a sophisti-
cated timing regime. Exploiting timestamp-based
information has previously helped identify bots.8
8https://www.indy100.com/article/brexit-party-nigel-
farage-twitter-following-behaviour-fake-genuine-accounts-
8920681
(a) Overall graph in order of
user posting time variation
(b) Lowest temporal standard
deviation accounts
Figure 2: Standard deviation in posting minute for
#dkpol posters. Note small volume of low-σ posters.
We examined the following temporal facets of a
user’s timeline (i.e. 200 most-recent tweets):
• Activity at strange hours, e.g. 00.00 – 05.00,
suggests overseas or automatic posting;
• The standard deviation σ of the minute-of-
day that the posts are at; low variance can
indicate one form of automatic activity
• Users who post in bursts, having the majority
of their most-recent tweets be very close to
the collection time.
Figure 1 shows diurnal activity in the general
dataset. Overall, 1,215 of 7,005 users had been so
active in the election period that their entire 200-
tweet historical sample lay within it; the remainder
sent fewer than 200 tweets during the election.
First, we looked at accounts posting at unusual
times, namely 0am-5am (the least-active period).
The filter was applied when over half the user’s
tweets fell in this window. There were only a
handful, about 0.2% of all users. Most of these
were in the USA or had US politics as their dom-
inant topic; these mostly worked in English but
a few tweeted in other languages. Being in the
US would explain unusual (for Denmark) activity
times. On manual inspection of this small volume,
all accounts looked legitimate.
Another way of finding suspicious accounts is
to see how irregular their posting pattern is. We
measured deviation σ over the minute of day that
each account posted at. Low variance indicates
an automated posting pattern. In our data, 1% of
users (73 in the sample of 7005) had a σ < 60 (one
hour) indicating a tightly regular posting pattern.
Results are shown in Figure 2.
The most unusual account is @folketingeterd,
with posting minute σ = 1.49 (compare with the
mean standard deviation of 119). This is an on-
line version of Jakob Jakobsen’s artwork contain-
ing statements that a politician has died (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Tweets from @folketingerd
This account is automated, and so the bot detection
method has worked, finding a non-malicious bot.
Some low-σ accounts behaved like amplifiers,
having a high degree of political content, a high
proportion of retweeting, and also appearing in
our time-of-day and posting intensity analyses be-
low. However, none operated in Danish. Over-
all, looking at the 100 lowest-variance accounts
that did not state they were from an organiza-
tion, we found various unusual accounts: pro-Iran
anti-Putin; Japanese cartoon pornography; auto-
mated general interest content retweeting; com-
bined Greek and Turkish adverts; dedicated pro-
Trump videos and news; and pro-Iran content in
Farsi. Few accounts were run in Danish.
One account showing unusual temporal activity
is that of Lars Løkke Rasmussen, prime minister
at the time of the election. This account is most
active late on Sunday nights (Figure 4) – perhaps
to make sure that people who see interesting things
there will discuss them at work the next day.
Finally we selected accounts that posted over 50
messages a day (or over 200 in a four-day win-
dow). This high temporal intensity sample com-
prised 47 accounts, 0.67% of the sample, many of
which exhibited suspicious activity. Some were
also present in the low-temporal-deviation list.
4.3 Spatial Account Activity
One way of finding an account posting from an-
other country is to check the locations messages
Figure 4: Tweets from the Danish prime minister’s account (Lars Løkke Rasmussen). Note specific targeting of
Sunday evenings. Via https://accountanalysis.lucahammer.com/
are tagged with. Criminals have in the past
been caught out by letting their real location slip
out (Lee, 2013), or so-called “location leaking”.
We will use this information source to build a
short-list of potential disinformers and manipula-
tors. For example, an automated account may be
set to post everything from Copenhagen claiming
to be using an iPhone, but the account’s operator
may post from their real location and forget to set
“Copenhagen” when e.g. replying to a comment.
We monitor account locations using user-
supplied locations and, when present, GPS. The
target pattern is where most of the tweets have
one location, but a small number have somewhere
quite different. For example, where e.g. 99%
of posts are labelled “Copenhagen” and 1% are
from e.g. Moldova, where the account operator
has stepped in to manually place a post.
User-supplied locations were sometimes unreli-
able, and will contain fictitious locations such as
“mitten im Leben”, “the void”, or “Planet Earth”,
matching expectations from earlier studies (Hecht
et al., 2011). The fact that these non-locations are
present is not problematic: the goal of this exercise
is to detect anomalous location behaviour.
• Copenhagen (481)
• København, Danmark (427)
• Denmark (395)
• Copenhagen, Denmark (342)
• Danmark (309)
• København (203)
• Aarhus, Danmark (85)
• København, Hovedstaden (68)
• Hovedstaden, Danmark (59)
• Odense, Danmark (52)
• Aarhus, Denmark (46)
• Frederiksberg (41)
• Aalborg, Danmark (40)
• Frederiksberg, Danmark (40)
• Aalborg (36)
• Odense (36)
• Aarhus (36)
• Arhus (35)
• Midtjylland, Danmark (17)
• Sjælland, Danmark (17)
• Odense, Denmark (16)
• Arhus, Denmark (15)
• Brussels, Belgium (15)
• Syddanmark, Danmark (15)
• Fredericia, Danmark (15)
We see a reasonably clean set of data. The
top 22 locations are all within Denmark, and only
three locations in the top 50 are outside: Brussels,
London, and Europe. This makes an ostensibly
homogeneous, Danish dataset.
There are many accounts that post almost al-
ways from “Denmark” but sometimes from a city
in Denmark (e.g. 199 tweets from “Danmark” and
one from “Aarhus”). This pattern of mostly cities
in one country and a few mentions of another city
in the same country continues in cases of foreign
locations. There are a few cases of accounts that
post 99% from Denmark and 1% from e.g. Chi-
ang Mai or Mauritius. We inspected 90 accounts
that had a regular posting location with < 2% of
the tweets from unusual locations. All these ap-
peared to be people on holiday or making occa-
sional trips; unusually-located content often were
about the location, e.g. a user checking in to a new
place and drawing attention to it.
4.4 Multi-language Accounts
A further way of finding foreign interference is the
see what other languages people active on #dkpol
use. This can reveal accounts that primarily act in
foreign languages. An automatic language detec-
tion tool called langid.py (Lui and Baldwin, 2012),
which performs well on social media text in gen-
eral (Derczynski et al., 2015b), does this.
Over the same users, we are interested in those
who use a non-Danish language more than seldom
(in more than 20 of their posts). Out of the 7,005
Figure 5: Amplification of a bilingual Danish/English
propaganda source on #dkpol
users, 3,126 are active in English, 115 also use
Swedish, 65 German, 50 Spanish, and 48 Farsi.
Other languages exist but at low counts.
A higher threshold (> 50% in non-Danish) in-
dicates accounts that are primarily multilingual
or non-Danish. This matches 1,806 accounts
(25.8%), the primary language of which is over-
whelmingly English (1,483), or Swedish (77),
German (38), French (30), Italian (28), Faroese
(26) or Spanish (25). The dominance of English
may be partly attributed to Denmark being small
and so having nationals who also use English to
reach the broader world. Overall this does not
remove foreign manipulation through brigading,
which is when people organise themselves ad-hoc
to influence an online discussion using their per-
sonal accounts. Random examination of accounts
did not reveal much active #dkpol interaction. Of
course this does not rule out domestic brigading,
which would not be detected through language ID.
There is some unusual, manipulator-like activ-
ity in the English tweets. Some accounts push
a political point of view by retweeting very or-
ganised sources. These sources use multiple lan-
guages. We see bilingual activity, with accounts
that use #dkpol spreading news in either both En-
glish and Danish, English and Swedish, or English
and German (e.g. Figure 5). Social media ma-
Propaganda narrative
Arabic teaching in school
Arabic writing on election poster
Syrians propagating
Muslims support a left-wing minister
Muslims take over foreign political party
Muslims take over domestic political party
Muslims cause crime abroad
We cannot build a country together with muslims
There have been attacks on nationalists abroad
Foreigners are committing crimes
Foreigners are expensive to integrate
Foreigners are draining pension funds
Anti semitism
US hyperpartisanship
There will be major pension cuts
Foreigners are draining pension funds
Police are supporting extremists
Police are ignoring hate crimes in the name of jihad
5G is very harmful to humans
Table 2: Groups of topics discussed by misinformation
spreaders engaged on #dkpol
nipulation is well-organised in Britain, Sweden,
and Germany (Howard and Kollanyi, 2016; Gor-
rell et al., 2018; Bradshaw and Howard, 2018; Ny-
gren et al., 2019; Neudert, 2017), countries having
languages that Danes are likely to understand.
We filtered for accounts that had been active on
#dkpol and used Danish in under half their tweets,
finding 1806 accounts. From a sample, about 30%
appeared to be mixed-language accounts working
as amplifiers. They retweet stories selecting those
that have an anti-EU, anti-feminism, pro-Trump
agenda. They generally retweet the same story
in multiple languages and stick to a small num-
ber of sources, including cartoons (often the same
one across all accounts) and shock stories. Some
of these accounts were also found in the high tem-
poral intensity set described above.
From this, it seems that about 4-5% of #dkpol-
active accounts sometime engage in propaganda
spread. However, they do not usually do it in Dan-
ish. This corresponds to a low-effort campaign
which as Gorrell et al. (2019) note typically has
little effect on views.
5 Discussion
In general, we found that Danish Twitter is rel-
atively free from misinformation – more so than
Twitter in e.g. the UK, even controlling for size.
5.1 Propaganda topics: Islam and pensions
We segment the misinformation propagated on
Twitter into topics (Table 2), taken from the 10
most recent posts by 50 suspicious accounts. As
accounts tweet at different rates, directly compar-
ing volumes between accounts did not make sense.
Anti-Islam material is by far the most dominant.
Material about problems with foreigners also fea-
ture, which matches findings around typical party
discussion topics (Derczynski et al., 2019). Pen-
sions make a cursory appearance, perhaps playing
on the finding that over-65s are more susceptible
to false news (Guess et al., 2019).9
5.2 Limitations
The current case study is limited to Twitter. This
is primarily due to Facebook’s restrictions on data
access for research, compared to Twitter’s.
Facebook is essentially a black box of informa-
tion when it comes to monitoring and data collec-
tion in emergencies; on the other hand, it offers
user privacy by default. Facebook is the domi-
nant platform in Denmark, with over 80% of res-
idents over age 17 using Facebook every single
day (Runge, 2019) – Twitter is used by fewer than
5% of residents.10 Other social media platforms
like Instagram and Snapchat, and local sites like
Hestenettet and Slyngebarn (a forum that is like
Danish Mumsnet), do not make up nearly as much
of Danish social media consumption as Facebook.
This means Denmark must rely on Facebook, it-
self a huge foreign corporation that is difficult to
regulate (Vaidhyanathan, 2019), to manage misin-
formation detection and to spot domestic manip-
ulation. We know, however, that Danish Twitter
and Danish Facebook share roughly similar politi-
cal views (Derczynski et al., 2019).
6 Conclusion
We examined misinformation on Danish Twitter
during the 2019 national elections, analysing over
1.5 million tweets over the three-week process.
A lower bound was established, and various be-
havioural and content-based techniques applied to
help find suspicious accounts and activity. Twitter
bore less misinformation than expected, and while
signs of low-effort manipulation were present, the
manipulation was not customised to Denmark.
So, to answer the research question posed in
the introduction: there is mild evidence of some
9An important counterpoint to this finding is that younger
internet users may be better at spotting badly-designed pages
but are in fact worse at discriminating between well-written
true and manipulative content (Nygren and Guath, 2019).
10http://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats/all/denmark
manipulation on Danish Twitter, and low evidence
for misinformation. The easiest to detect is from
cross-border accounts working in multiple lan-
guages, sometimes not using Danish at all. It re-
mains hard to precisely locate sources of misinfor-
mation and manipulation, but it appears that they
are either unmotivated foreign actors, or – perhaps
more likely, given the content of the known misin-
formation – native-speaking domestic actors.
Despite this, one should not paint a rosy picture
of social media in Denmark. We have determined
in some cases only lower bounds, i.e. minimum
levels, of misinformation spread. We know that
propaganda targets Denmark (even if the Russian
ambassador declared that meddling in Danish pol-
itics ”makes no sense” 11).
We believe that protecting Denmark from mis-
information is best achieved through understand-
ing the threat better, in three ways: through mod-
elling relevant misinformation networks in detail;
with better NLP tools for Danish; and through get-
ting better access to Facebook, the dominant plat-
form here. We discovered efforts to disturb Danish
political discourse; these should not be ignored,
but instead pursued and used to develop defences.
Synthetic propaganda is unlikely to perturb the
Danish web until someone invests in training mod-
els like Grover (Zellers et al., 2019) and GPT-
2 (Radford et al., 2019) for Danish. Given the cur-
rent misinformation effort here, which one would
expect to be most visible during election times,
this is not a current major threat for Denmark.
On the other hand, Facebook’s policies make
it hard for others to develop social media propa-
ganda defences. There are few tools for defend-
ing against misinformation on Facebook. Also,
most misinformation research is on English; there
are few tools for other languages. Denmark is
Facebook-heavy and Danish-speaking. So, while
propaganda continues to target Denmark, there is
simultaneously little defence available.
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A Appendix: Party acronyms
Party Acronym Official letter Twitter account
Alternativet - A˚ @alternativet
Dansk Folkeparti DF O @DanskDf1995
Det Konservative Folkeparti K C @konservativedk
Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne EL Ø @Enhedslisten
Klaus Riskær Pedersen KRP E @KlausRiskaer
Kristendemokraterne KD K @KDDanmark
Liberal Alliance LA I @liberalalliance
Nye Borgerlige NB D @NyeBorgerlige
Radikale Venstre RV/R B @radikale
Slesvigsk Parti - S @SlesvigskParti
SF – Socialistisk Folkeparti SF F @sfpolitik
Socialdemokratiet SD A Spolitik
Stram Kurs SK P @RasmusPaludanA1
Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti V V @Venstredk
Parties surveyed, including acronym, the one-letter code that Danish parties use in campaigning, and the
Twitter account monitored. Ordering taken from the official parliament website at http://ft.dk/.
A1: The prior official account for this party was banned by Twitter.
